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Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy
Controls
Abstract
This paper investigates how internet users’ perception of control over their personal
information affects how likely they are to click on online advertising. The paper uses
data from a randomized field experiment that examined the relative effectiveness of
personalizing ad copy to mesh with existing personal information on a social network-
ing website. The website gave users more control over their personally identifiable
information in the middle of the field test. The website did not change how advertisers
used anonymous data to target ads. After this policy change, users were twice as likely
to click on personalized ads. There was no comparable change in the effectiveness
of ads that did not signal that they used private information when targeting. The
increase in effectiveness was larger for ads that used less commonly available private
information to personalize their message. This suggests that giving users the percep-
tion of more control over their private information can be an effective strategy for
advertising-supported websites.
Keywords: Privacy, Online Advertising, Social Networks
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Introduction
Firms that try to use consumers’ data for marketing purposes face a trade-off between
consumers’ expressed preferences for control over how their private information is used and
shared, and the need to use this information to increase interest in the firm’s product offering.
This tension has been particularly pronounced on social networking websites like Facebook
and MySpace. These websites have collated a huge amount of personal data from their users
and offer advertisers unique, proprietary ad networks that push the boundaries of tailored
advertising. To reassure customers about such uses of customer data, social-networking
sites have pioneered new technologies that allow consumers explicit control over how much
information about them is publicly available. In this paper, we assess how such strategies
for giving customers control over their personally identifiable information affects the ability
of such sites to support themselves through advertising.
This matters because social networks allow advertisers to go beyond simple targeting
techniques and actually personalize ad content. If a nonprofit selects fans of Oprah Winfrey
on Facebook as a fruitful pool of potential supporters, it can then include a reference to Oprah
Winfrey in its personalized ad copy. However, research has shown that consumer privacy
concerns affect the performance of targeted ads (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2010a). Consumers
might see personalized ad content as more appealing and tied to their interests, but they
might conversely see it as as ‘not only creepy but off-putting’ if they felt the firm had violated
their privacy (Stone, 2010).1 The paper studies the extent to which consumer perceptions
of control over their private information affect the performance of this type of personalized
advertising.
This research uses data from a randomized field experiment conducted by a US-based
nonprofit to optimize their advertising campaigns on Facebook, a social networking web-
site. These campaigns were shown to 1.2 million Facebook users. The nonprofit’s aim
was to raise awareness of its work improving education for women in East Africa. The
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nonprofit randomized whether they explicitly personalized the ad copy to match the user’s
profile. For example, sometimes the text of the ad made an appeal based on the consumer’s
self-expression of whether they ”Liked” celebrities and writers who in the past had made
statements supporting the education of girls in Africa or African female empowerment in
general. On other occasions, the nonprofit used that information only to target the ad: i.e.
they targeted the ad to people who liked a celebrity, but showed them only a generic ad that
was not personalized.
In the middle of the field experiment, after Facebook had encountered much criticism
for not allowing users enough control over their privacy, Facebook announced a large and
well-publicized shift in their privacy policy. The aim was to reassure users about how their
data were used, by giving them more control over their privacy settings. This change did not,
however, affect how advertising was displayed and targeted, since the advertising platform
used anonymous data. The nonprofit had not anticipated there would be such a change when
it launched its field test of the ads. However, the fact that the change occurred mid-way
through the field experiment is valuable for measuring the effect on advertising effectiveness
of such a change in privacy policies, while circumventing the usual endogeneity issues.
We compare how well the personalized ads performed before and after this change in
policy relative to targeted and also untargeted ads. Targeted but non-personalized ads
provide a particularly useful comparison, because they were served to the same individuals
as the personalized ads. The only difference was that the ad itself did not make clear what
information (if any) was being used to target the ad. It is not clear how strengthening
users’ perceived control over their personal information would affect attempts by advertisers
to use users’ information to enhance their ad content. On the one hand, the shift might
sensitize users to privacy concerns, and make advertisers who try to use such information
more unpopular, even if the use of such information were effectively anonymous. On the
other hand, behavioral research has emphasized the importance of consumer perceptions of
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control for mediating privacy concerns (Xu, 2007; Brandimarte et al., 2010). If users feel
reassured that they have control over how the information about them is being used and
that their personal information is secure, they may find such ads less off-putting.
We use data on how many users clicked through on each ad for a five-week period span-
ning the policy change. Empirical analysis of both campaign-level and individual-level click-
through data suggests that personalized advertising was almost twice as effective at attract-
ing users to the nonprofit’s Facebook page than was targeted but non-personalized advertis-
ing, after the shift in Facebook policy which alleviated many users’ privacy concerns. Before
the policy change, when privacy concerns were highly salient due to very heavy press cov-
erage, personalized advertising performed slightly less well than merely targeted ads. There
was little change in the effectiveness of targeted advertising and non-targeted advertising
over the period. This is to be expected, because such ads do not make clear to consumers
whether their private information is being used to target, and the privacy settings policy
change did not change how ads were served to users.
Identification comes from the assumption that there were no underlying changes in user
behavior that coincided with the policy change but were not directly attributable to the
policy change. To check robustness to this assumption, we both check that our results are
robust to a shorter time frame and run a falsification check for an earlier period where
there was no such policy change. We find no significant change in user behavior. We also
check that there was no significant change in the user composition of Facebook or advertiser
behavior during the period we study.
We then investigated the mechanism underlying our finding that consumers responded
more positively to personalized advertising after the policy change. In particular, we evalu-
ated whether consumers were concerned that advertisers, when using this information, were
tracking the user’s behavior in a potentially intrusive way. To evaluate this, we used data
on the number of users who fell into each targeting category. There are almost two mil-
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lion fans of Oprah Winfrey on Facebook, but some targeting variables were unusual enough
that their potential reach was only in the thousands. We found that personalization was
relatively more effective for personalized ads in ad-targeting categories which used unusual
information after privacy controls were enhanced. This provides suggestive evidence that
indeed consumers were concerned that the information being used in the ads was simply too
personally identifiable without a corresponding sense of control over their data.
These findings contribute at four levels.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies how giving web users better control
over how their private information is shared, affects advertising outcomes. The finding that
there are positive effects for advertisers of addressing users’ privacy concerns is potentially
useful to advertising-supported websites, as currently there is much debate in the industry
about the effects of addressing users’ concerns. In a well-publicized survey, Turow et al.
(2009) found that 66 percent of Americans do not want marketers to tailor advertisements
to their interests. Fear of such resistance has led advertisers to limit their tailoring of
ads (Lohr, 2010). However, our results suggest that there are benefits to the advertising-
supported internet of reassuring users explicitly about how their private information is shared
and used. Our results emphasize that the design of privacy settings can be a crucial strategic
marketing variable.
On the academic side, this paper’s focus on advertising complements research that has
focused on more general questions of information sharing and privacy in social networks
(Caverlee and Webb, 2008; Golder et al., 2007; Acquisti and Gross, 2006). Early research
on privacy tended to simply describe privacy as a matter of giving users control over their
data (Miller, 1971; Culnan, 1993; Smith et al., 1996). However, more recent research has
challenged this and shown how individual-level control over information can mediate privacy
concerns, even if access to the data remains unchanged. Xu (2007) shows in a lab-experiment
that people have fewer privacy concerns when given explicit control over publication of loca-
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tion data. Brandimarte et al. (2010) show in three lab experiments that giving users control
over how much of their private information is published paradoxically encourages them to
reveal more personal and potentially sensitive information than they may do otherwise, even
though people’s actual access to the data in question did not change. This is consistent with
research such as Spiekermann et al. (2001), which suggests that the very existence of privacy
protection, even if not actually pertinent, can lull users into a perhaps false sense of secu-
rity. This paradox is also clear in our own data. The mere fact of giving users control over
personally identifiable information appears to reassure users about the use of anonymized in-
formation in advertising and makes them more amenable to it. More generally, our research
also reflects the importance of trust in mediating privacy concerns from ad personalization,
which has been documented in survey-based research by Chellappa and Sin (2005).
The paper also contributes to the online advertising literature. It appears that personaliz-
ing ads using user-disclosed information in the ad copy increases their appeal if accompanied
by appropriate privacy controls. This was studied from a theoretical perspective by Anand
and Shachar (2009), who pointed out that the signaling power of a targeted ad in the tradi-
tional ad-signaling framework (as laid out by Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984); Milgrom and
Roberts (1986)), could be strengthened by personalizing the ad, making consumers more
likely to assume there is a match between them and the product. This paper is also one of
the first studies of advertising by an external firm on a social networking site. The majority
of the empirical work on targeting and social networks has studied offline methods. For
example, Manchanda et al. (2008) has studied the role of social networks and targeting of-
fline. Previous studies in marketing about social networking sites, have questioned how such
sites can use advertising to obtain members (Trusov et al., 2009), and also how makers of
applications designed to be used on social networking sites can best advertise their products
(Aral and Walker, 2010) through viral marketing.
There have been no studies, however, to the author’s knowledge, that examine social
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network advertising by firms not directly related to the site who simply wish to exploit
the unusual features of social networking sites as an attractive advertising channel. This
is important, because social networking sites are attractive media venues that are growing
rapidly in importance. They have a youthful and passionate following: The average Face-
book user in the United States spent 6.5 hours on Facebook over the course of December
2009, which was more than twice as long as the next leading web brand (Nielsen, 2010).
Facebook doubled its U.S. audience from 54.5 million visitors in December 2008 to 111.9
million visitors in December 2009, and now accounts for 7% of all time spent online in the
U.S (Lipsman, 2010); worldwide, its membership passed 500 million in July 2010. However,
social-networking websited have previously been perceived as being problematic venues for
advertising because of extremely low click-through rates (Holahan, 2007). This research
suggests that if consumers are reassured about their privacy, firms can use personalization
of ads to generate higher click-through rates.
Finally, these findings are also important from a marketing policy perspective. The re-
sults shed light on the benefits of websites giving consumers clear control over how their
information is used and accessed by advertisers. Currently proposed regulations governing
behavioral advertising in the US are focused around the mechanics of how firms implement
opt-in and opt-out use of cookies and other tracking devices (Corbin, 2010). Previous em-
pirical research suggests that this approach, by limiting the use of data by firms, reduces ad
effectiveness (Goldfarb and Tucker (2010b)). By contrast, the results in this paper suggest
that when privacy regimes are primarily focused on letting customers choose how personally
identifiable information about them is shared and used, there is no negative effect on ad-
vertising performance. The current staff-discussion draft of US privacy legislation proposed
by Representatives Boucher and Stearns exempts individually managed preference profiles
(P.17, Sec. 3(e)). This provision may be an important way of ensuring the advertising-




The nonprofit running the experiment provides educational scholarships in East Africa that
enable bright girls from poor families to go to or stay in high school. Part of the nonprofit’s
mission involves explaining its work in Africa to US residents and also engaging their enthu-
siasm and support for its programs. In order to do this, the nonprofit set up a Facebook
‘page’ which explained its mission, and also allowed people who were interested to see photos,
read stories and watch videos about the girls who had been helped by the program.
To attract people to become fans of its Facebook page, the nonprofit started advertising
using Facebook’s own advertising platform. Initially, they ran an untargeted ad campaign
which displayed an ad in April 2010 to all users of Facebook that live in the US, and
are 18 years and older. This campaign experienced a very low click-through rate. The
disappointing nature of this campaign led them to want to see if they could engage further
with their potential supporters by both targeting and personalizing ad content.
Randomized Campaign
The nonprofit designed two separate campaigns with two separate target populations. The
aim of the campaign was to encourage users to click on the ad and become a fan of the
nonprofit’s website. The first target population were college graduates from small liberal arts
colleges that had a reputation of emphasizing the benefits of education for the community.
Facebook started as a college-based social network, so it explicitly facilitates the identification
of such graduates, and most users indicate what educational institutions they have attended
and whether they are a current student or a graduate.
The second target population were Facebook users who had expressed appreciation for
celebrities and writers who in the past had made statements supporting the education of girls
in Africa or African female empowerment in general. Examples could be Oprah Winfrey,
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who has set up a girls’ school in South Africa, or Serena Williams, who was a supporter of
‘Build African Schools.’ There were 19 such celebrities in total.2 Such Facebook users are
identified by whether they mention they ‘like’ such a person in their likes or interests section
on their Facebook profile.
However, it was unclear to the nonprofit whether they should also personalize the ad
content that these users saw. They thought that personalization might improve their ad’s
appeal, but they also did not want their ad to be unattractively intrusive or make potential
supporters feel that their privacy had been violated. In order to establish whether Facebook
user data should be used merely to target ads, or should in addition be used to personalize
the content of the advertising appeal, they decided to experiment with two different ad
formats. Table 1 summarizes the different conditions used. In the personalized condition,
the ad explicitly mentioned the targeting variable. In the targeted but non-personalized
case, the ad was similar in content but did not explicitly mention the targeting variable. In
each case the ad was accompanied by the same picture of a girl who had been helped by the
program. Based on the work of Small and Verrochi (2009), this girl had a slightly mournful
expression.
[Table 1 about here.]
In addition to these two campaigns, the nonprofit also continued to use as its baseline,
a non-targeted campaign which reached out to all adult US Facebook users simultaneously.
This provided an additional baseline control for advertising effectiveness over the course of the
study. The text of this baseline and non-targeted ad read “Support [Charity Name]. Help
girls in East Africa change their lives through education.” This ad and the two targeted
campaigns were restricted to Facebook users who live in the US, and were 18 years and
older. The charity set a daily maximum spending cap on advertising campaigns that was
significantly below the $250 a day maximum spending cap mandated by Facebook. It also
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agreed to pay at most $0.50 for each click produced by the different advertising campaigns.
Figure 1 is a screenshot which shows the Facebook interface used to design and target an
ad. To preserve the anonymity of the nonprofit, it shows a mock ad for a marketing journal.
On the right-hand side, there is a sample ad which is similar in format to the ad used in
the tests, and gives an accurate representation of the relative size of text and photo in the
actual ad. The lower panel shows how an advertiser would theoretically target people who
are interested in online marketing and who also had a college degree in marketing. On the
right-hand panel, Facebook offers an estimate of the potential ad-reach of such targeting - in
this case just 380 people in the US. We use such ad-reach data in our subsequent regressions
to explore the behavioral mechanism driving our results.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Facebook’s ad server encourages the comparative testing of different types of ads within a
campaign, but there are no guarantees that each ad will be shown to users in exactly the same
proportions. For example, if an advertiser was concerned primarily with retaining equivalent
statistical power, they might choose to show each of the advertising campaigns being tested
10,000 times every day. However, Facebook does not guarantee this because it is constrained
by who is using Facebook at any one time and what advertising inventory it has to sell. For
example, it is easier for Facebook’s ad servers to identify 10,000 people who are fans of Oprah
Winfrey than 10,000 people who are fans of an obscure 1960s feminist poet. We control for
error this may have introduced in our regression analysis by controlling for both the type of
targeting variable and the date. However, ultimately what is important for our key findings
is that there was no change in how the nonprofit managed the field experiment before and
after the policy change, in particular in how it handled personalized relative to targeted ads,
and also that there was no change in the way that Facebook’s ad servers delivered ads before
and after the policy change (This is documented in the appendix).
10
Policy Change
What was unique and potentially valuable about this field experiment was that on May
24 2010 (after the field experiment was planned and initiated and the first data collected),
Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, announced that the company would be simplifying
and clarifying their privacy settings as well as rolling back some previous changes that had
made Facebook users’ information more public. Studying this change was not the purpose
of the randomized field experiment, but it fortuitously presented a unique opportunity to
study how a change in user privacy controls in social networking sites can change consumer
responses to advertising, since the nonprofit tested the ads using the same randomization
technique before and after the policy change.
[Table 2 about here.]
The background to this policy change was that Facebook had been heavily criticized
because its privacy settings were very granular and difficult to access. For example, Bilton
(2010) pointed out that the 5,850 words of Facebook’s privacy policy were longer than the
United States Constitution, and that users wanting to manage their privacy settings had to
navigate through 50 settings with more than 170 options. As detailed by Table 2, Facebook
had previously acted to reduce the amount of control users had over their data and had
attracted bad publicity for doing so. As well as bad press, Facebook faced legal challenges.
In December 2009, ten privacy groups filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission3
over changes to Facebook’s privacy policy which included default settings that made users’
status updates available potentially to all Internet users, as well making users’ friend lists
publicly available.
There were three major components to Facebook’s policy change. The first was that all
privacy settings were aggregated into one simple control. Users no longer had to deal with 170
granular options. As depicted in Figure 2, this interface was far more approachable and easily
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adjustable than before. Second, Facebook no longer required users’ friends and connections
to be visible to everyone. Third, Facebook made it easier to opt out with a single click
from third-party applications from accessing users’ personal information. Generally, these
changes were met favorably. For example, the chairman of the American Civil Liberties
Union, Chris Conley, wrote ‘The addition of simplified options (combined with the continued
ability to fine-tune your settings if you wish) and user control over Facebook’s ‘connections’
are significant improvements to Facebook’s privacy.’
[Figure 2 about here.]
This change in privacy settings did not change how the banner ads that were served
on a Facebook’s website were targeted, or whether advertisers could use user information
to personalize ads. Display advertising was treated separately because, as Facebook states,
‘Facebook’s ad targeting is done entirely anonymously. If advertisers select demographic tar-
geting for their ads, Facebook automatically matches those ads to the appropriate audience.
Advertisers only receive anonymous data reports.’4
To reassure advertisers that the change would not adversely affect them, Facebook sent
out an email to its advertisers saying that ‘this change will not affect your advertising
campaigns’ (The full letter is reproduced in the appendix.) This means that though users
were given control over how much information was being shared and the extent to which
they were being tracked by third parties, the actual mechanism by which the ads tested
were targeted and served was not changed. This means that the policy change should be
viewed as the effect of a policy which was designed to let users control what information was
published and whether they were being tracked by third parties in a personally identifiable
way, rather than a policy change that limited how well advertisers could use information to
advertise with.
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We compare the relative performance of personalized and targeted ads before and after
this policy change to see whether the ability of users to control their personal data, makes
them more or less responsive to different forms of advertising. In particular, we evaluate
whether explicit control over their privacy settings makes Facebook users more or less re-
sponsive to ads that are personalized. It is not clear, ex ante, how the policy change will
affect the performance of personalized ads. On the one hand, more control over data may
make users more likely to respond to advertising favorably, as they know that their data have
not and will not be misused. Further, behavioral research has emphasized the importance
of consumer perceptions of control for mitigating privacy concerns (Xu, 2007; Brandimarte
et al., 2010).On the other hand, when users have explicit control over their privacy settings,
that may simply increase the salience of privacy concerns, making personalized advertising
more problematic, since users may already feel that they have rejected it. Targeted ads
provide a particularly useful comparison because they were randomly served to the same
type of individuals as the personalized ads, and the only difference was that the ad itself
did not make clear what information (if any) was being used to target the ad. A further
comparison to untargeted ads allows us to make sure there was no underlying shift in adver-
tising effectiveness that was general to Facebook and not related to the salience of privacy
concerns.
Data
We obtained daily data from the nonprofit on how well each of the ads performed for the
duration of the experiment. There were 79 different ad campaigns for which we obtained
daily data on the number of times they were shown and the number of clicks. In total these
ads were shown to 1.2 million users and they received 1,995 clicks. When a user clicked on
the ad, they were taken to the nonprofit’s Facebook page.
There were 39 different targeting variables, which each had a personalized and a targeted
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variant. 19 of these targeting variables were based on where the user had expressed liking
of various celebrities, 20 on whether the user had attended a particular liberal arts college.
There was also an untargeted campaign. These data spanned 2.5 weeks on either side of the
introduction of privacy controls on May 28, 2010. We also check robustness to this time-span
in Table 4.
This data included the number of unique impressions (that is the number of users the
ad was shown to) and the number of clicks each ad received. It contains information on the
date that click was received but does not provide time of day information. It also includes
data on the cost to the nonprofit per click and the imputed cost per thousand impressions.
There is also information collected separately by the nonprofit while designing its ads on the
potential ‘ad-reach’ of each of its targeting variables. This reflects the number of Facebook
users whom Facebook estimated could be in the target segment for any targeted ad-campaign.
To protect the privacy of the nonprofit’s supporters, we did not receive information about
the backgrounds or identities of those who chose to like it, or on any of their actions after
they made that choice. We also do not have information about whether these users did
indeed change their privacy settings.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics. The average number of clicks relative to ad
impressions is relatively small, at two-tenths of one percent. This is even smaller when
looking at the daily level, since many campaigns received no clicks on a given day, inflating
the appearance of low click-through rates. We use both aggregate and daily measures of
click-through rates in our regressions, and find qualitatively similar results. However, this is
similar to rates reported by other advertisers for Facebook ads. In their provocatively-titled
piece ‘Facebook Ad Click-Through Rates Are Really Pitiful’, Barefoot and Szabo (2008)
reported average click-through rates between .01% and 0.06%. As a side note, the nonprofit
considers the campaign to have been an immense success, especially given the relatively
small cost of the trial (less than $1,000). From having a small social media presence, it was
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able to achieve a vibrant and active set of fans who respond and interact to news updates
delivered about the nonprofit’s mission and activities. Compared to its peer nonprofits, it
now has a far broader and deeper social media presence.
[Table 3 about here.]
Analysis
Figure 3 displays the average click-through rate for each campaign before and after the policy
change. Ads that personalized their content appeared to greatly increase in effectiveness
after the policy change. This change was highly significant (p-value=0.0047). The effects of
targeting ads without personalizing their content before and after the policy change were not
significantly different (p-value=0.407). There appears to be little change in the effectiveness
of the un-targeted campaign, though of course with only one campaign it is impossible to
assess statistical significance.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 4 examines whether there were any differences for the two types of targeting
variable (by school and by celebrity). It is evident that on average the celebrity-focused
campaign was more successful on average at attracting clicks. However, it appears clear that
there was a similar incremental jump in the effectiveness of personalized ads after the policy
change for both kinds of targeting variable.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 3 suggests that the personalization of ads was more effective after Facebook re-
assured users about privacy concerns by facilitating users’ taking control of their personal
information. To check the robustness of this result, we also performed regression analysis.
This allows us to assess the statistical significance of our results in various robust ways. It
15
also allows us to make sure the result is not an accidental result of a Facebook ad server’s
particular randomized allocation of one campaign to a particular day.
We model the click-through rate ClickRatejt for ad j on day t in the following manner:
ClickRatejt = Personalizedj × PostPolicytγk + δt + j (1)
Personalizej is an indicator variable which is equal to one if the ad contained person-
alized content matched to the variable on which it was targeted, and zero if there was no
personalized content. PostPolicyt is an indicator variable equal to one if the date was after
the privacy-settings policy change took place, and zero otherwise. γk is a vector of fixed
effects for the 20 different undergraduate institutions targeted and each of the 19 celebrities
targeted. These control for underlying systematic differences in how likely people within
that target segment were to respond to this charity. We include a vector of date dummies
δt. These are collinear with the PostPolicyt which means PostPolicyt is dropped from the
specification. Because the ads are randomized, both of these fixed effects should primarily
improve efficiency. We estimate the regression using ordinary least squares. Following ev-
idence presented by Bertrand et al. (2004) we cluster standard errors at the ad-campaign
level to avoid artificially understating our standard errors due to the fact we have panel data.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 presents our results. Column (1) is our main specification, as suggested by
Equation 1. The crucial variable of interest is Personalize × PostPolicy. This captures
how an individual exposed to a personalized ad responds differently to a personalized ad
compared to a targeted ad with generic wording after Facebook’s change in privacy policy. It
suggests a positive and significant increase in the performance of personalized ads relative to
merely targeted ads after the policy change enhanced user privacy controls. The magnitude
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of our estimates suggest that the percentage click-through rate increased by 0.024, relative
to a baseline percentage click-through rate of .0232 for personalized ads. In other words,
the click-through rate doubled. The negative coefficient Personalized which is marginally
significant suggests that prior to the change in privacy settings personalized ads were less
effective than ads that did not use personalized ad copy.
This empirical analysis uses a short time window of 5 weeks. This has a flavor of regression
discontinuity in its approach, in that it looks for changes in consumer behavior around a
short time window (Busse et al., 2006). This means that it is unlikely that there was some
long-run trend, for example, in terms of increasing user acceptance of personalization of ads,
that drove the results. It also helps to rule out an explanation that people were becoming
‘habituated’ to privacy concerns because of the relentless media coverage and consequently
less reluctant to click on personalized ads. To provide further evidence that the change was
connected with the policy change, we repeated our estimation using a shorter time window
of 10 days around the policy change. We use a specification similar to that in column (2) of
Table 4. The results, reported in Column (2) of Table 4, were similar.
We also did a falsification check, where we examined a similar 10 day window that
occurred before the policy change at the end of May, to see whether we see any similar time
trend in the second week compared to the first week even when there was no policy change
in effect. By examining such a ‘placebo’ policy change that occurred midway through this
10-day window, we are able to provide some suggestive evidence or not about whether such
dramatic swings as we observe in our data are observed even when there was no actual policy
change. Column (3) of Table 4 reports the results. It is clear that there was no statistically
significant change in the performance of ads and that in particular there was no difference
in the time-trend of the performance of personalized ads versus merely targeted ads.
The policy change can be tied to a date more specifically than the introduction of many
policy changes, but there are still a few open questions about the effective timing of the
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change, given that, as shown in Table 2, there was a series of discrete events surrounding the
policy change. The remainder of Table 4 checks robustness to various timing assumptions we
made about the actual date of the policy change. There were two days in between Facebook
announcing the policy change on May 24 and announcing the details of the policy change
on May 26. Since this may have introduced uncertainty, we checked robustness to omitting
these two days in column (4). The results are similar. The privacy changes were heralded in
the press on May 27th, but there was also a rollout period where Facebook introduced the
first of the three changes in its privacy policy - the new privacy settings page - gradually,
presumably to minimize the risk of servers becoming overloaded. It is not clear how long
this rollout period lasted or how long the majority of US subscribers (who we study) took
to obtain access. To check robustness to this rollout, we excluded the first five days of data
after the policy change.5 The results are reported in column (5). Again, the results are
similar.
The results in Table 4 confirm the insight from Figure 3 that the policy change improved
the performance of personalized ads in terms of the average campaign click-through rate.
To try to measure how the policy change affected an individual’s likelihood of clicking on an
ad, we also estimate an individual-level logit model. One advantage of an individual-level
model is that we can include the untargeted campaign in our regressions as an additional
baseline, as rather than one observation of a click-through rate of the untargeted campaign
which is collinear with the fixed effects, there are hundreds of thousands of observations of
how individuals responded to that campaign.
We model the probability that an individual i clicks on ad j on day t as:
Clickedijt = I(Personalizedj × PostPolicyt + Targetedj × PostPolicyt (2)
+Personalizedj + Targetedj + Postpolicyt + γk + δt + j)
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Equation (2) is similar to Equation (1), except for the inclusion of a new indicator
variable Targetedj. Targetedj is an indicator variable for whether the ad was targeted, but
had no attempts at personalization - in other words, it would have been difficult for the
consumer to know why they received that ad. As explained by Ai and Norton (2003), in a
logit model, compared to a linear probability model, interpretation of interaction terms is
not straightforward, as they are a cross-derivative of the expected value of the dependent
variable. This is a particular issue for three-way interactions. To address this, we estimated
a logit model and used these logit estimates to predict average probabilities while taking
into account the fact that there were cross-derivatives in the specification. Table 5 reports
the results of these logit model predicted probabilities. The results are reassuringly similar
to those in Table 4, even though we are now studying behavior at an individual level.
Personalized ads were significantly worse than non-personalized ads before the policy, but
performed almost twice as well after the policy. There was no significant shift in the efficacy
of untargeted or targeted ads before and after the policy.
[Table 5 about here.]
Further Robustness Checks
We also obtained further information to determine whether there were any other environ-
mental changes that could explain the result. One potential concern is that our results reflect
a change in the numbers of users of Facebook. For example, an alternative explanation of
our results could be that the negative publicity drove more experienced users away, leaving
only users who were likely to react to personalized advertising using Facebook. However,
the data in Table 6 suggest that this was not the case. This data set was obtained from
comScore and is based on their panel of two million internet users. There was little change
in the composition of the user base in June relative to May, compared to the shifts seen from
April to May. Further, the number of unique visitors to Facebook appeared to steadily, if
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slightly, increase across the months.
[Table 6 about here.]
Another concern is that the results could reflect a change in the composition of advertis-
ers. For example, perhaps other advertisers pulled out of Facebook as a result of the negative
publicity of privacy, meaning that perhaps there were fewer advertisers competing to per-
sonalize advertising, which made the personalized ads relatively more attractive. Though we
cannot check for evidence of this directly, we are able to provide some suggestive evidence
against this counter-explanation by looking at the pricing data for the ads. If there had
been a drop-off in advertisers, we would expect also to see a decrease in the price paid in the
auction, as the price should theoretically be a function of the number of bidders (McAfee
and McMillan, 1987). However, the small drop in cost per click of 1.5 cents after the policy
change was not statistically significant (p-value=0.59).
Mechanism: Rarity of User Information
One question is what privacy concerns consumers had that the policy change resolved, lead-
ing customers then to respond more positively to personalized ads. One explanation is that
consumers were concerned that advertisers, when using this information, were tracking the
user’s behavior in a potentially intrusive way. Ad-intrusiveness has been documented by
Goldfarb and Tucker (2010a) as potentially off-putting for consumers. Facebook had expe-
rienced negative publicity for sharing data with third-party advertisers, so this may have
been a reasonable concern. In this section, the paper presents some suggestive evidence that
supports this interpretation.
We explore this by exploiting additional data and variation across ad campaigns about
how many users were in the target group for that particular campaign such as that provide in
Figure 1. If the main effect of giving users transparent control over how their data are used is
that they are less concerned they being tracked, then we might expect to see this reflected in
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differences in consumer behavior across the rarity of information used in the ad. For example,
if an ad was personalized around the fact that a Facebook user liked ‘cooking,’ then Facebook
has 3,167,540 users who state they like cooking. The use of such information might be felt to
be more anonymous and less likely to be a result of, or result in, privacy-violating tracking
behavior by that advertiser. However, if an ad was personalized around the fact that a user
liked the Korean delicacy kimchi, then there are only 6,180 Facebook users who say that
they do like kimchi; knowing that such a preference is relatively rare might make the user
more concerned they were being tracked by the advertiser in a privacy-violating manner.
Table 7 investigates how our effects were moderated by the rarity of the targeting variable
or the ad reach. Column (1) of Table 7 reports how the efficacy of personalized ads relative to
ads that were targeted to users’ interests before and after the policy change was affected by
the reach of these targeting variables. The negative coefficient on ‘Post-Policy × Personalized
× Ad Reach’ suggests that the positive effect is smaller for ads that had a larger ad reach
than those that had a smaller ad reach. In other words, personalization was relatively more
successful after the policy change for celebrities who had smaller fan bases, as can be seen
from the larger point estimate for ‘Post-Policy × Personalized’ relative to Table 4, column
(1). Ad-Reach is denominated in millions of users. Therefore, roughly extrapolating from
the linear functional form, our estimates suggest that for ads for the 7 percent of campaigns
in our sample that have target audiences of greater than 372,000, the effect of the policy
was canceled out. However, for the median campaign, which had 7,560 people in the target
market, the effect of the policy change actually raised the click-through percentage by 0.03,
relative to a mean of 0.02.
Column (2) of Table 7 repeats this exercise for ads that used the shorter ten-day window.
Again, the results appear robust, providing evidence against an interpretation that that an
unobserved time-trend unrelated to the change in policy drove the results. Column (3) of
Table 7 provides further evidence that the change observed was connected with the policy
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change by conducting a ‘falsification’ check for a placebo policy-change mid-way through a
10-day window prior to the policy change. The results are again insignificant.
These results suggest that the shift towards giving users control over their personal in-
formation, had the largest effect for personalized advertising that attempted to use more
unusual pieces of information. This provides suggestive evidence that the change in privacy
policy was able to reassure users that despite the advertisers’ use of potential unusual infor-
mation about them, that they should be less worried about their privacy. It also suggests
that the gains to personalized advertising with appropriate privacy concerns, may be highest
when the advertiser uses information that is relatively unique about that user.
[Table 7 about here.]
Implications
This paper is the first to explore the consequences for advertising-supported websites of
giving users more control over how their personal information is shared. The paper uses
data from a randomized experiment conducted by a nonprofit that was designed to explore
the relative merits of targeting ads, and ads that used user information to personalize content
of the ad. During the field experiment, the social networking site on which the experiment
was being conducted unexpectedly announced that it would change users’ privacy settings.
These changes, which were publicly applauded by consumer advocates, gave users greater
control over what personally identifiable information was shared and whether third parties
could track their movements. They did not however, affect the anonymous use of information
by advertisers to target their information. Empirical analysis suggests that after this change
in policy, the websites’ users were roughly twice as likely to react positively to personalized
ad content and click on personalized ads. There was generally no economically significant
change in their reactions to un-targeted or merely targeted ads. This suggests that publicly
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giving users control over their private information can benefit advertising-supported media
and advertisers on such sites.
There are obvious limitations to this research that are worth mentioning. First, the
randomized experiment was conducted by a nonprofit with an appealing cause. Consumers
may be ready to ascribe less pernicious motives to a nonprofit than to a for-profit company
when they observe their advertising. Second, this randomized experiment was conducted at
a time when privacy concerns were particularly sensitive and salient in consumers’ eyes. It
is not clear how the results will change when social network users are not being reminded
about the control they have (or lack of it) over their private information. Third, the type of
privacy control introduced by Facebook that we study was just one of a myriad of potential
ways that social networks or other advertising-supported websites could used to give control
to their users over their privacy settings. It would be interesting for future research to see
whether an explicit ‘opt-in’ approach to sharing information or changes in privacy policies
that explicitly addressed advertising could produce equally striking results. Notwithstanding
these limitations this paper does provide initial evidence of the potential role of privacy-
settings and privacy control as a useful and important strategic marketing variable.
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Notes
1As stated in Stone (2010) ‘What a marketer might think is endearing, by knowing a
little bit about you, actually crosses the line pretty easily.’
2The nonprofit is eager to protect the privacy of its supporters, and consequently has
asked the authors to not reveal either the names of the celebrities or of the schools that were
used in this advertising campaign.
3http://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf.
4There is one privacy control that governs the use of information in Facebook ads which
can be reached from an entirely different menu than the regular user privacy settings (Ac-
count Settings > Facebook Ads rather than Account > Privacy Settings). This enables
users to control whether ads shown by Facebook can use their name or photo in ads served
to their friends that are linked with social actions (such as becoming a fan of a page). The
settings for this control appear to have not been affected by the change in privacy policy.
This feature was also not used in the advertising campaigns studied.
5Anecdotal evidence from independent forums discussing the introduction of privacy set-
tings suggests that US users had been given access within the five days.
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Facebook’s Notification to Advertisers: May 26, 2010
Facebook will roll out changes today that will make it easier for our users to understand and
control their privacy settings. As this change will have an impact on our users, we wanted
to let you, a valued advertising partner, know about it. Please note that this change will
not affect your advertising campaigns and there is no action required on your part.
Facebook is a company that moves quickly, constantly innovating and launching new
products to improve the user experience. The feedback we heard from users was that in our
efforts to innovate, some of our privacy settings had become confusing.
We believe in listening to our users and taking their feedback into account whenever
possible. We think the following changes address these concerns by providing users with
more control over their privacy settings and making them more simple to use.
Starting today, Facebook will:
* Provide an easy-to-use “master” control that enables users to set who can see the
content they share through Facebook. This enables users to choose, with just one
click, the overall privacy level they’re comfortable with for the content they share on
Facebook. Of course, users can still use all of the granular controls we’ve always offered,
if they wish.
* Significantly reduce the amount of information that must be visible to everyone on
Facebook. Facebook will no longer require that users’ friends and connections are
visible to everyone. Only Name, Profile Picture, Networks and Gender must be publicly
available. Users can opt to make all other connections private.
* Make it simple to control whether other applications and websites access any user
information. While a majority of our users love Facebook apps and Facebook-enhanced
websites, some may prefer not to share their information outside of Facebook. Users
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can now opt out with just one click.
I encourage you to take a moment to read our CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s blog post and check
out the new Facebook Privacy Page.
Thanks, The Facebook Ads Team
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Table 1: Campaigns appeals in different conditions
Targeting Variable College Interest
Personalized As a [undergraduate insti-
tution name] graduate you
had the benefit of a great
education. Help girls in
East Africa change their
lives through education.
As a fan of [name of
celebrity] you know that
strong women matter. Help
girls in East Africa change
their lives through educa-
tion.
Non-Personalized You had the benefit of a
great education. Help girls
in East Africa change their
lives through education.
You know that strong
women matter. Help girls
in East Africa change their
lives through education.
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Table 2: Timeline for Facebook Growth, Privacy and Advertising
Date Event
February 2004 Facebook launched from Harvard dorm room.
November 2007 Facebook launches ‘Facebook ads’. Advertising pilot involving ‘bea-
cons’ (small 1x1 pixel web bugs) allows Facebook to track users’ move-
ments over other websites for purposes of targeting.
December 2007 Facebook makes Beacon an opt-out service after negative publicity.
September 2009 Beacon ad targeting program shut down amid class-action suit.
November 2009 Facebook changes its default settings to publicly reveal more of its
users’ information that had previously only been available to Facebook
users. This information could now be tracked by third-party search
engines.
December 9 2009 Privacy settings are entirely removed from certain categories of users’
information. These categories include the user’s name, profile photo,
list of friends and pages they were a fan of, gender, geographic region,
and networks the user was connected to. They are instead labeled as
publicly available to everyone, and can only be partially controlled by
limiting search privacy settings. Founder Mark Zuckerberg’s photos are
apparently inadvertently made public by the change in settings.
December 17 2009 Coalition of privacy groups led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
files a complaint with Federal Trade Commission over changes to pri-
vacy settings
April 2010 Facebook users’ General Information becomes publicly exposed when-
ever they connect to certain applications or websites such as the online
review site Yelp. General Information includes users’ name and their
friends’ names, profile pictures, gender, user IDs, connections, and any
content shared using the Everyone privacy setting.
May 12 2010 New York Times publishes article entitled ‘Facebook Privacy: A Be-
wildering Tangle of Options’ (Bilton, 2010). This ignites a firestorm of
negative press about Facebook and privacy.
Monday May 24 2010 Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg announces in an editorial in the
Washington Post that Facebook will institute new privacy settings
Wednesday May 26 2010 Facebook unveils new privacy settings in press event
Thursday May 27 2010 Facebook starts rollout of privacy settings. New York Times publishes
‘A Guide to Facebook’s New Privacy Settings’.
Saturday May 29 2010 First reports of new privacy setting controls being seen by users
Additional Sources: Facebook’s official public timeline; ‘Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy:
A Timeline’: Electronic Frontier Foundation April 2010.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Average Impressions 15892.7 63274.2 337 551783
Average Clicks 25.3 53.7 0 374
Average Cost Per Click 0.38 0.096 0.11 0.50
Cost per 1000 views 0.095 0.12 0 0.39
Ad-Reach (000000) 0.095 0.21 0.00098 0.99
Aggregate Click-Through Percentage 0.17 0.23 0 1.37
Daily Click-Through Percentage 0.023 0.14 0 3.13
Campaign level data. 79 Different Campaigns (78 campaigns based on 39 different targeting
variables each with personalized and targeted variants. 1 untargeted campaign)
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Table 4: Initial Results
Main Result 10-Day Window Fake Policy Unveiling excluded Rollout excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personalized × PostPolicy 0.0236∗∗ 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ 0.0218∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0208) (0.0105) (0.0110)
Personalized × Fake-PostPolicy -0.0144
(0.0192)
Personalized -0.0119∗ -0.0112 -0.0116 -0.0118∗ -0.0112
(0.00627) (0.0115) (0.0103) (0.00675) (0.00715)
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targeting Variable Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2730 780 780 2574 2340
R2 0.060 0.118 0.082 0.062 0.068
OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click through rate.
Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
PostPolicyt is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification.
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Table 5: Predicted Probabilities based on a logit regression
Ad-Type Time-Period Predicted Probability Std. Err. Z-Statistic [95% Conf. Interval]
Untargeted × Pre-Policy 0.0003 0.0001 10.7300 0.0002 0.0005
Untargeted × Post-Policy 0.0006 0.0001 10.0000 0.0005 0.0007
Targeted × Pre-Policy 0.0024 0.0001 25.0700 0.0022 0.0026
Targeted × Post-Policy 0.0025 0.0001 22.4100 0.0023 0.0027
Personalized × Pre-Policy 0.0018 0.0001 14.8800 0.0016 0.0021
Personalized × Post-Policy 0.0035 0.0001 25.6400 0.0032 0.0037
Log-likelihood 13,825
Observations 1,248,899
Marginal Effects calculated from logit model where dependent variable is individual click-through probabil-
ities. Date and Targeting fixed effects included.
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Table 6: Little Change in Facebook User-Base Composition
Proportion of Group April 2010 May 2010 June 2010
Age <17 10.4 10.6 11.4
Age 18-24 19.2 19.4 18.6
Age 25-34 20.8 20.7 20.8
Age 35-44 20.4 19.9 19.9
Age 45-54 16.7 16.5 16.5
Age 55-64 8 8.1 8.1
Age 65+ 4.6 4.8 4.7
Income <$15k 10.1 10.3 9.7
Income $15-24k 6.2 6.1 5.9
Income $25-39k 12.5 12.7 13.5
Income $40-59k 22.1 22 24.2
Income $60-74k 10.9 11.3 9.6
Income $75-99k 16.8 16.3 15.3
Income $100k+ 21.5 21.2 21.8
Male 47.2 47.1 48.2
Female 52.8 52.9 51.8
Total Unique Visitors 121 Million 130 Million 141 Million




Main 10-Day Window Falsification Check
Post-Policy × Personalized × Ad-Reach -0.0852∗∗ -0.199∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0966)
Fake Post-Policy × Personalized × Ad-Reach 0.0615
(0.0559)
Personalized -0.0153∗∗ -0.0228 -0.0138
(0.00670) (0.0188) (0.0135)
Post-Policy × Personalized 0.0317∗∗ 0.0662∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0251)
Personalized × Ad-Reach 0.0354 0.125 0.0232
(0.0214) (0.0850) (0.0278)
Post-Policy × Ad-Reach 0.0150 -0.00677
(0.0350) (0.0497)
Fake Post-Policy × Personalized -0.0202
(0.0237)
Fake Post-Policy × Ad-Reach 0.00877
(0.0493)
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Targeting Variable Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2730 780 780
R2 0.062 0.129 0.085
OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click through rate.
Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01
PostPolicyt is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification. Ad-Reachk is
collinear with the targeting variable fixed effects and also dropped from the specification.
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Figure 1: Facebook: Screenshot of Ad Targeting Interface
Source: Mock-up ad campaign for marketing journal created by authors
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Figure 2: Facebook: Screenshots of Privacy Options before and after the policy change
Source: Gawker Media
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Figure 3: Comparison in Click-Through rates before and after
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Figure 4: Comparison in Click-Through rates before and after
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